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© Equinox Publishing Ltd. 2009 gram "would bring together people in the humanities, arts, social and natural sciences with representatives from professional schools like medicine, law, business, engineering, social work, theology and architecture." (What does it tell us about Taylor's assumptions or his experience that he groups theology among the professional schools?). The obvious problem is that this arrangement would last only for one or two generations. Then the thread of the disciplinary traditions would be broken. This would be utterly disastrous for the humanities: they would become superficially appropriated adjuncts to business and engineering. In this sense, Taylor is simply calling for the completion of a trend that is already visible at many smaller colleges and universities.
If the trustees of the disciplines are to serve as trustees for a larger civilizational heritage, then the cure for narrowness is not subjecting scholars to a merry-go-round career of task forces, but rather requiring research projects to demonstrate that their focussed attention to detail also opens onto broader perspectives and deeper questions that link the project to the foundations of the broader discipline, and the discipline to the larger family of disciplines. From this point of view, Taylor's example of narrow research, though no doubt rhetorically effective for most readers of the New York Times, seems to show a lack of imagination on his part. He remarks: "A colleague recently boasted to me that his best student was doing his dissertation on how the medieval theologian Duns Scotus used citations." As a student of postmodernism, Taylor ought to know that Scotus plays a central role in the critique of modern reason developed by scholars of the Radical Orthodoxy school, like John Milbank and Katherine Pickstock. He is a figure around whom deep questions of philosophy, theology and political theory cohere. While I do not know the colleague, the student, or the project referred to by Taylor, I can well imagine that an investigation of Scotus' use of citations could shed light on his relationship to the whole philosophical and theological tradition as a tradition, and could give some insight into how radical his intentions were as a "founder" of modern thought. Such a project could also, if rightly guided, provide the budding scholar with a profound direct encounter with a great thinker, which might lay foundations for an independent position from which to engage significant contemporary thinkers both sympathetically and critically.
The more valuable suggestion Taylor makes toward restoring wholeness is that the undergraduate curriculum be restructured to be more cross-disciplinary. Graduate students should expect to have to teach more than the intro courses and narrow topics of their discipline. Broader education, and
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© Equinox Publishing Ltd. 2009 correspondingly broad research, would then have the support of professional expectations and market incentives. This would be a small but significant corrective to over-specialization, one that would not require the short-sighted abolition of the disciplines, but would rather enrich disciplinary education. In Taylor's woolly futurism, untethered from disciplinary guilds and infected with the catchwords of management theory, this reform takes the shape of "a web or complex adaptive network." Such adaptation would probably be guided by whatever is fashionable and catches the passions of the moment. A cross-disciplinary curriculum needs some steadier guiding principles.
These are, in fact, not hard to find. Educational critics as different as Cardinal Newman, Allan Bloom and Jacques Derrida all recognize that philosophy and theology are the fundamental and integrating disciplines. Unfortunately, these studies are generally too deeply infected by the professionalized specialization that reigns in the academy to understand themselves in this role with regard to the other disciplines. Even Catholic universities that still require students to study philosophy and theology usually undermine the most compelling rationale for such a requirement by failing to charge them with this integrating role within the curriculum. Most institutions simply have no compelling or thoughtful understanding of what constitutes a real undergraduate education.
Part of the reason for this is that most institutions have ceased to care. Taylor does not mention at all the thing universities do care about, the priority that drives much of their decisions and shapes the pressures they put on faculty. Universities and colleges usually care most about prestige. Why do they want scholars to pour so much time and energy into publishing in "journals read by no one other than a few like-minded colleagues"? Generally, it is enough if such work is read by two colleagues, the ones involved in the blind review process that is the guarantor of respectable research and high professional standards. By opening with his industry-metaphors, and unveiling the economic motives that inflate the numbers of graduate students universities admit, Taylor gives the appearance of offering a hard-headed analysis. But any proposal for reforming colleges and universities that does not address head-on their obsession with prestige can hardly be taken seriously as a practical program.
For a scholar, prestige is bound up with the rage for originality. This seems to be the hidden engine by which Kant's still slightly old-fashioned notion of trusteeship has been driven into increasingly narrow avenues. In Kant's dispassionate enlightenment vision, research is progressive and cumulative, and the scholar makes his or her contribution to the progress of this vast hu-
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© Equinox Publishing Ltd. 2009 man enterprise. In human terms, however, the demand for novelty harnesses and feeds the motive of vanity. The gratification of a vanity that bases itself on claims to originality is best served by ignorance of the tradition; it is easier to overlook how derivative and unoriginal almost all our thoughts are if we never encounter the originals from which they derive. Thus the rage for originality undermines the responsibility and satisfaction of trusteeship.
Taylor himself seems uncritically enamored of this rage for originality; it is the only mark of successful teaching that he acknowledges in his editorial. The rhetoric Taylor uses to make his "vision" inspiring is antithetical to the notion of trusteeship. He hopes that proposals such as his will "open academia to a future we cannot conceive." Insofar as it opens traditional disciplines to a future of chaos, it is true that we can have no clear conception of what it will look like. But in broader terms, this future is not hard to conceive at all. It is barbarism. Any reader of Tocqueville will recognize it, moreover, as a provincially American program of barbarism: dominated by pragmatist exigencies, absorbed in the present and enamored of a vague (but undoubtedly better) future, with no regard for the past.
